English translation of Prof. Dr. Mehmet Karaçuka’s column first published in Seferihisar Yeni Haber on 9 July 2026: “NATO Ankara Zirvesi Ardından Doğu-Batı Arasında Türkiye.”
The NATO summit held in Ankara was important for Turkey not only because the country has the alliance’s second-largest armed forces, but also because of the changing relations among Turkey, the United States and Europe. Rather than seeing the choice of Turkey as host as arbitrary, it is more appropriate to understand it as a reflection of the country’s growing importance to the Western world.
Before discussing that importance, let us state the conclusion clearly. The world is no longer divided into the two blocs of the Cold War, nor is it the de facto unipolar world centered on the United States and Europe that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union. China has moved beyond the status of a regional power and is now a global economic, political and military actor. At the same time, regional crises are giving rise to new powers and new alignments.
Europe, meanwhile, is more absorbed in its domestic problems than ever before. Chronic economic difficulties have pushed far-right parties toward the center of political debate. This transformation has the potential to reshape not only domestic politics but also international relations, particularly with Russia.
Above all, Europe has entered a period in which its long-established security arrangements no longer operate as they once did. After the Cold War, the European Union focused on economic integration under the American security umbrella. Today it faces security pressures from abroad as well as deep political and economic difficulties at home. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine accelerated this process, while the growing unpredictability of US foreign policy during Donald Trump’s second term has taken it into a new phase. European capitals increasingly acknowledge that the continent can no longer entrust its security entirely to the United States.
This has special significance for Turkey. Although Europe has sometimes competed with Turkey in the Middle East, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Caucasus, it cannot ignore Turkey’s geopolitical and military importance in the face of the Russian threat. This is now being acknowledged more openly not only in Ankara but also across Europe.
NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte’s comments emphasizing Turkey’s role and defense capabilities illustrate this shift in attitude. Turkey’s prominence as host of the 2026 Ankara NATO summit and the emphasis on its defense-industry role within the alliance should be understood in the same context.
Similarly noteworthy were Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s positive remarks about Turkey’s EU membership during his visit to Ankara in 2025. Poland is among the countries that have historically experienced the Russian threat most directly. From the perspective of Eastern Europe, Turkey is not simply an important ally on NATO’s southern flank; it is an integral component of European security.
Nevertheless, Europe does not speak with one voice. Despite the institutional appearance of unity, different political preferences, national interests and security priorities persist within the European Union and the continent more broadly. A growing consensus may favor Turkey’s inclusion in Europe’s security architecture, but there is substantial disagreement over the appropriate level and institutional framework for such involvement.
Whereas Eastern European countries tend to support stronger Turkish integration into European security arrangements, some Western European countries favor a more limited role. Germany appears to have adopted a more pragmatic and positive approach toward Turkey in recent years, while France remains more cautious because of its historical, geopolitical and defense-industry interests. Objections from Greece and the Greek Cypriot administration, even when not decisive, continue to figure in political bargaining over Turkey’s participation in European defense projects.
For Turkey, the situation is particularly complex. It is one of NATO’s principal military powers, yet it cannot simply abandon its trade, energy and diplomatic ties with Russia. Relations between Ankara and Moscow have deepened considerably in recent years. Dependence on energy supplies, the Akkuyu nuclear power plant, natural gas, tourism, agricultural trade and diplomatic contacts over regional crises all make this relationship highly sensitive. Turkey has also declined to join Western sanctions against Russia in full since the invasion of Ukraine, instead pursuing a balancing policy.
A deeper role for Turkey in Europe’s defense architecture would therefore likely be viewed negatively by Russia. Such a development could create challenges for Ankara’s policies in the Caucasus, Syria, the Black Sea and energy markets. At the same time, Europe’s search for security could give Turkey strategic bargaining power that it has lacked for many years. With an appropriate response, Turkey could obtain economic, technological and diplomatic benefits as well as military advantages.
Recent EU defense initiatives are important in this context. The European Commission’s ReArm Europe/Readiness 2030 plan aims at a substantial expansion of defense expenditure. It envisages mobilizing more than €800 billion in additional defense spending and offering up to €150 billion in loans to member states through the SAFE instrument. Europe is thus entering a new defense era not merely in its political rhetoric but also in the allocation of financial resources.
Yet this raises a crucial question for Turkey: does Europe truly intend to treat Turkey as an equal strategic partner, or does it primarily wish to benefit from Turkish military capacity? Ankara’s response will help define its foreign policy in the coming period. President Erdoğan’s calls for NATO allies to lift defense-industry restrictions and not exclude Turkey from European security initiatives show that Ankara is not simply waiting passively for decisions made elsewhere.
Closer relations with Europe would undoubtedly matter to Turkey. Europe remains one of Turkey’s largest trading partners. Modernizing the Customs Union, visa liberalization, defense-industry cooperation, technology transfer, energy security and investment could all offer substantial benefits. But not every form of European integration produces the same outcome. Developing strong economic and strategic ties with Europe is one thing; full integration into the European Union’s extensive bureaucracy is a different choice.
Turkey therefore needs a dual strategy. First, it must make clear that it is indispensable to European security. Second, it must define this indispensability through more than military contributions: through diplomatic capabilities, its defense industry, energy corridors, migration management, Black Sea security and the balance of power in the Middle East. If Turkey can turn Europe’s security needs into bargaining opportunities compatible with its national interests, it may emerge from this period in a stronger position.
Yet Europe itself is hardly entering an easy period. Germany and France, the Union’s two largest driving forces, have experienced severe economic and political pressures. In Germany, the collapse of the coalition government during Olaf Scholz’s period and the start of a new political era under Chancellor Friedrich Merz have not eliminated problems surrounding industry, energy costs, fiscal discipline and defense spending.
In France, the political fragility highlighted by the short life of the Barnier government has become even more apparent toward the end of Emmanuel Macron’s presidency. Budget deficits, public debt, pensions, social unrest and the rise of the far right make effective government difficult. The continuing strength of Marine Le Pen and the National Rally as the 2027 election approaches points to a persistent crisis of political representation.
Underlying these political difficulties are economic problems. High inflation since 2021, the energy crisis, weak growth, a loss of industrial competitiveness and pressure on public finances have generated widespread dissatisfaction. In Germany, debates over the budget and the constitutional debt brake have contributed to government crises; in France, proposals to increase taxes and cut spending to reduce the deficit have placed governments under pressure. European voters now question not only promises about the welfare state but also how those promises will be financed.
The political beneficiaries of this environment have often been anti-establishment movements rather than traditional centrist parties. The rise of the AfD in Germany, the National Rally in France and radical movements elsewhere is no coincidence. Slow growth, inflation and a sense of declining real income can push voters toward more radical political alternatives, threatening both economic and democratic stability.
Europe’s central dilemma is clear. Faced with the Russian threat and diminished confidence in the United States, it needs stronger defense capabilities. Yet it lacks both the economic dynamism and the political cohesion required to finance them easily. Raising defense spending may widen budget deficits, while strict fiscal discipline can limit defense investment. When household purchasing power is already under pressure, large allocations to defense can also provoke political opposition.
It is against this fragile European background that Turkey is repositioning itself. Perhaps never before in modern history has Europe’s need for a strong Turkey been so evident. But need does not automatically translate into benefits for Ankara. Historical prejudices, institutional concerns and domestic political constraints in Europe remain powerful. There is still a significant gap between Europe’s strategic need for Turkey and its willingness to regard Turkey as an equal member of the European family.
Turkey should therefore avoid a hurried or romantic policy based solely on encouraging signals from the West. It should deepen relations with Europe, strengthen defense and technology partnerships and seek tangible progress on the Customs Union and visa liberalization. At the same time, it should not entirely sacrifice the multidimensional foreign-policy balance it has established with Russia, the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Turkic world.
A new order is taking shape in Europe, centered on security, defense industries, energy, fiscal discipline and political stability. Turkey occupies a position in which it is both needed and viewed with caution. This dual position presents significant opportunities alongside serious risks.
The appropriate course for Turkey is to turn Europe’s search for security into a realistic, multidimensional strategy consistent with its own national interests. Closer relations with Europe are in Turkey’s interest, but their conditions, scope and institutional form must be calculated carefully. The issue is not simply whether Turkey moves closer to Europe, but with what influence, bargaining power and strategic identity it will take its place in the changing world order.
Original Turkish article: Seferihisar Yeni Haber — NATO Ankara Zirvesi Ardından Doğu-Batı Arasında Türkiye (9 July 2026).
