It is possible to say that Europe finds itself in a difficult position following Donald Trump’s re-election in the United States and the shifting priorities of the U.S. Last week, U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance, speaking in Munich, mocked Europe as a place that boasts about its wines, classical architecture, and welfare checks, while also being corrupt and undemocratic. European leaders were excluded from the peace talks between the White House and the Kremlin, which officially began in Riyadh on February 18. The U.S. now seems closer to Russia’s stance on Ukraine, and Trump appears ready to abandon Ukraine, holding it responsible for the war. Labeling Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky a “dictator,” Trump warned him that “if he doesn’t act quickly, he’ll be left without a country.” If America forces an unstable ceasefire on Ukraine with weak security guarantees, it could prevent Ukraine from rearming and lead to its complete surrender.

For Europe, the situation is even worse, extending beyond Ukraine. It appears that Trump plans to abandon the policy of isolating Russian President Vladimir Putin and instead seeks to legitimize him again. Trump’s exclusion of Europe and his rapprochement with Russia cast doubt on America’s unconditional commitment to defend its NATO allies and, by extension, Europe. A reduction in the number of American troops in Europe and a U.S. withdrawal that would leave Eastern Europe vulnerable are among Russia’s demands. 

So, what is Europe doing amid such a geostrategic transformation? After World War II, Europe prioritized peace and disarmament policies. Indeed, the two major wars of the first half of the 20th century deterred Europeans from viewing military methods as a tool for solving problems, leading to significant steps toward a united, peaceful Europe through the establishment of the European Union. It was assumed that American military power would forever protect Europe against the only threat—the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc. However, 35 years after the end of the Cold War, the old order has changed, a new world order has emerged, and the reality of Europe’s inadequacy in defense has come to light.

The old continent of Europe still lags far behind in defense spending compared to global benchmarks. Moreover, Europe—economically stagnant, with a rapidly aging and shrinking population, constantly borrowing, and facing the threat of Asia in global trade—lacks the “hard power” capacity that is sometimes essential in politics. Europeans are now considering efforts to establish a European Defense Force. However, the formation of such a force seems unlikely. Domestic political divisions and differing priorities in relations with Russia and the U.S. among European countries already hinder a common European foreign policy, making the creation of a united European Army equally challenging.

During the Cold War, Turkey stood out as Europe’s outermost defense line. The question that comes to mind from that era remains relevant today: Will Turkey—or should Turkey—participate in a United European Army? Without resolving tensions in Turkey-EU relations, such a scenario seems improbable. Furthermore, in many cases, Turkey’s strategic priorities do not align with Europe’s. Yet, if Europe is to acquire hard power, it will somehow need to partner with Turkey. While Europe may not need Turkey in the Middle East—and even sees it as a rival—it requires Turkey to counter the Russian threat.

On the other hand, it appears that Turkey no longer needs Europe as much as it once did. In such a period, Turkey must work on a future scenario based on its own policies, within the framework of the changing world order, while avoiding dependency on any specific bloc as much as possible, in line with its priorities.